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Calvins Reformation in Geneva:
Self and Social Signalling
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin
London School of Economics
Abstract
As Weber (1904) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predes-
tination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an
individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects
of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about
such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure
to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that in-
dividuals belong to the electand are therefore likely to behave
well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an insti-
tution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals
behaviour, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these
self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions a¤ect
levels of cooperation and coordination.
1 Introduction
Calvins reformation in Geneva, and from there in other city-states in
Switzerland and communities in France, has been recognized by some
as an instrumental and practical model of religious organisation.1 The
main innovation in Calvins reformation was to couple his version of the
doctrines of predestination and sanctication with the creation of a real-
world institution that governs social behaviour, the Consistory. In this
paper we analyse a model of such a religious organization.
The doctrine of predestination implies that an individuals destiny in
the afterlife, does not depend on his good deeds in this life. Both Martin
Luther and Calvin intertwine this with sanctication and justication.
Sanctication, according to both, implies that an individual who belongs
1MacCulloch (2010) argues that Calvins achievements led Protestantism out of
stagnation in the 1550sand had inuenced religious practice to this day (pp. 632).
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to the elect inhibits the traits of Jesus Christ and therefore follows his
examples of good works, both in his private and social life. Justication,
according to Calvin, implies that an individual may be in the elect and
hence salvaged only upon the grace of God, as For all man are not
created in equal condition rather eternal life is foreordained for some,
eternal damnation for others(Institutes, III. xxi 5).2
These doctrines, as Weber (1904) rst suggested, provide a strong
incentive for good works through self signalling: Individuals might look
at their own behaviour to be assured that they are part of the few who
will be saved. Weber (1904) writes: The question: Am I one of the
elect? must sooner or later have arisen for every believer and have forced
all other interests into the background. And how can I be sure of this state
of grace?. Calvin has therefore made good works and moral behaviour
the centre of religious life by creating a sense of anxiety over individuals
salvation.
But Calvin went beyond pure theology. In the Ecclesiastical Ordi-
nances (1541), Calvin drew up the structure of his well-ordered church
in Geneva. The most distinctive and controversial aspect of this orga-
nization was the Consistory.3 It was formed in 1542, their o¢ ce is to
have oversight of the life of everyone...There were to be twelve of them,
chosen from the members of the three councils, to keep an eye on every-
body.4 To be able to do so, the Consistory members met once a week
and visited the homes of each Genevan family twice a year, which allowed
them to be well informed. Deviant behaviour -religious and civil alike-
was punished by public scolding, sometimes by Calvin himself. When
other communities in Switzerland and France decided to adopt Calvins
religion, he insisted on the formation of local Consistories, which may
be better at collecting local information.5
In this paper we analyse a model of a Calvinistic religion which cre-
ates incentives for self and social signalling in the social arena. We
compare the welfare e¤ects of these signalling incentives. In particu-
lar, We consider a population whose members are randomly matched to
play a PrisonersDilemma for two periods.6 Individuals have di¤erent
2Luther in contrast suggested justication by faith, in which faith alone determines
the destiny of the individual. This assures salvation to those who believe in Christ.
3At the time, institutions called Consistories already existed in Europe and in
Geneva, mainly enforcing the canon marriage laws.
4Ecclesiastical Ordinances (1541), in Gilbert (1998).
5Calvins emphasis on discipline is evident in his insistence that discipline is the
third mark of a good Church (this was opposed by Lutherans) and is certainly a
mark of his own reign in Geneva.
6More generally we can use any social interaction in which trust is important. A
recent literature has analysed cooperation when players sustain (possibly di¤erent)
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convictions about their prospects of belonging to the elect which are
private information. We assume that individuals derive positive util-
ity from holding such convictions. Good works, i.e., cooperation in the
game, allow an individual to self signal that he is more likely to belong to
the elect.7 Individualsbehaviours in the rst period might be publicly
observed, depending on the level of dissemination of public information.
The model implies a spiritual as well as a material benet from co-
operative behaviour. When engaged in self signalling, individuals that
cooperate in equilibrium obtain a spiritual utility as they increase their
beliefs about salvation. When information about past behaviour is avail-
able, social signalling arises, and cooperation becomes a signal of reli-
gious conviction which is rewarded by more cooperative behaviour from
others in future interactions. This implies a material benet as well as
an enhanced spiritual benet as individuals are induced to cooperate
even more. Some individuals will be tempted to cooperate rst in order
to take advantage of others, so that such social signalling may not be
perfect. However, we show that the benets from social signalling can
outweigh such losses and individuals in society benet from more public
information.
This paper contributes to the economics literature on religious organ-
isations. Iannaccone (1992, 1998) and Berman (2000) analyse models of
religions in which religion is a club good and costly rituals serve to re-
solve free rider problems in the production of religious goods. Levy and
Razin (2011a) analyse a model in which costly rituals serve to signal
religious beliefs and intention of cooperative behaviour.
In Benabou and Tirole (2006), religious individuals have an incen-
tive to maintain their beliefs about private actions which facilitate hard
work.8 Glaeser and Glendon (1998) propose that the Protestant Ethic
induces individuals to shift their behaviour towards actions that are more
visible and conducive for signalling. These two papers accord with We-
bers (1904) ProtestantWork Ethic, which proposes that self signalling of
good works has evolved to attach value to hard work or personal success
and in particular to entrepreneurial and risky behaviour. In contrast,
we focus on the theological interpretation of good works as behaviour in
the social arena. We therefore consider the social ethicinduced by the
Reformation and not the work ethic.9 In Scheve and Stasavage (2006),
norms of cooperation, see for example Dixit (2003), Tabellini (2008), and Andreoni
and Samuelson (2006).
7For a discussion of self-signalling see Ainslie (1992). See Bodner and Prelec
(2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004) for other formal models of self signalling.
8See also Benabou and Tirole (2011).
9For an empirical study of the Protestant social ethic, see Arrunada (2010).
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religious beliefs allow for a psychic benet in bad times, and hence such
beliefs negatively correlate with preferences for social insurance.
Our analysis shows how religious organizations orchestrate behaviour
in the social sphere.10 This view of the role religious organizations in
consistent with recent empirical literature looking at the e¤ect of religion
on economic outcomes; see for example Barro and McCleary (2003) and
Guiso et al (2003).
Section 2 below presents the model of self signalling, and Section 3
allows for social signalling. A welfare comparison among the two is in
Section 4. An appendix contains all proofs.
2 The Model
The social interaction game consists of two periods. In each period, in-
dividuals are randomly paired to play a Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game:
C D
C d,d c,b
D b,c a,a
where b > d > a > c:We assume strategic complements, i.e., that d 
b > c  a: This assumption is standard in the literature on cooperation.
Our choice for the social interaction game is a¤ected by recent empirical
evidence showing that religious beliefs or practice a¤ect levels of trust
in society, which can be captured in the PD environment.11 For welfare
comparisons, assume that society always values cooperation so that 2a <
b + c and hence mutual defection is the worst outcome from a social
welfare point of view.
We assume that each individual i believes that he belongs to the
elect with some probability, initially i 2 [0; 1]: Belonging to the elect
provides some spiritual utility ": We sometimes refer to i as the indi-
viduals conviction and often suppress the subscript i. We assume that
the individuals conviction is private information. Let the initial types
in the population be distributed uniformly on [0; 1]. The heterogeneity
of beliefs in the population represents di¤erent reactions to exposure to
theological material, such as reading the Bible or the publications of
Calvin.
In Calvins theology, Sanctication implies that individuals who are
in the elect behave as Jesus Christ would. Accordingly, in our model, to
hold and maintain their beliefs individuals look back to their previous
social behaviour to infer the likelihood of belonging to the elect.
10Wilson (2002) and Stark (1996) provide numerous examples in which religions
provide material benets. These and others are discussed in Levy and Razin (2011a).
11The model can easily be extended to other types of public good games.
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We adopt the following simple, reduced-form, model of self signalling.
We assume that individuals believe that those who belong to the elect al-
ways cooperate, whereas all other individuals cooperate only with some
probability,  2 [0; 1]: We will shortly discuss how  is determined in
equilibrium but for now let us assume that it is given. Note that the
assumption that a person who belongs to the elect always cooperates is
a simplication and what is important is that his probability of cooper-
ation is higher than a normalperson.
Self signalling then amounts to an individual revisiting her previous
actions and noting whether she had cooperated or not. If an individual
with beliefs  cooperated in the rst period her posterior beliefs are that
she belongs to the elect with probability 
+(1 ) : On the other hand,
if she defects she will believe that she does not belong to the elect with
certainty.12 In accordance with Calvins writings, we assume that agents
believe that the population share of types who do belong to the Elect is
close to zero.13
We now discuss how  is determined. To this end, we adopt the con-
cept of Cursed Equilibrium due to Eyster and Rabin (2005). According
to that concept, an individual may fail to understand that the strategy
of a player may depend on his type, and consider instead the average
strategy in the population (which e¤ectively is the average in the pop-
ulation of players, i.e., normaltypes).14 We therefore assume that an
individual who updates his posterior probability about belonging to the
elect correctly conjectures the average probability of cooperation among
all types in the population, which we assign to be .15
The level  represents how individuals perceive normalbehaviour
in the population and hence 1    can capture the strength of self sig-
nalling. A high level of  corresponds to a high discipline as individuals
12A possible interpretation of this updating rule is that it actually occurs within
a dynasty by an individuals o¤spring, so that parents take actions that allow their
children to learn about their family type. Another way to conceptualize this is
to think of a model similar to Benabou and Tirole (2004) in which individuals may
receive signals about their past behaviour but may choose to manipulate these signals.
13This is not necessary for the analysis, in fact, it does not enter the updating
process as each individual cares only about his own probability of being in the elect.
Note that the belief that only a marginal share belongs to the Elect is consistent
with each individuals own belief but does not square with the distribution of beliefs,
which can be interpreted as a case of non-common priors.
14This is due to the assumption that the share of those that belong to the elect is
close to zero.
15In an alternative model one could assume that  is the individuals equilibrium
probability of cooperation in the rst period. The analysis of this model is compli-
cated by the continuum of types and for tractability we focus on the fully cursed
case.
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are almost as cooperative as Christ would have been, i.e., tend to behave
as they are told to by the scripts. This also implies that self signalling is
a rather slow process. A lower level of  implies less disciplined societies,
but faster self signalling.
Throughout we assume that " > a   c: This means that some in-
dividuals in society, with strong enough beliefs, will always cooperate
irrespective of their perception of othersbehaviour. The expected util-
ity of an individual in the beginning of the game is the sum over the
individuals utility from his behaviour in the two periods where the sec-
ond periods utility is discounted by . Each periods utility includes
the material payo¤ from the PD game, as well as the anticipation of the
spiritual payo¤, i.e., from his updated beliefs.
We look for an equilibrium in which: (i) at each period t 2 1; 2;
individuals correctly conjecture the average probability of cooperation
in the population, t; and update their beliefs according to that and their
own action; (ii) given their initial beliefs  and the expected behaviour
in the population, individuals play optimally in the PD game.
3 The option value of self signalling
As a benchmark, consider rst the case in which there is only one period.
Let c = b   d and d = a   c (these are the incentives to defect
conditional on the rival cooperating or defecting respectively). Given
that a share  of the population cooperates and the rest defects, the
relative payo¤ from cooperation vis-a-vis defection is
 c   (1  )d + 
+ (1  )"
where the spiritual payo¤ is the anticipation of how beliefs will be up-
dated following cooperation vis-a-vis defection.
This relative payo¤ is monotone in ; which implies that there must
be a cuto¤ ^ above which all types cooperate and below which all defect.
Thus  = 1  ^ and ^ solves
^
^+ (1  ^)2 " = (1  ^)c + ^d
The left hand side measures the spiritual benet of cooperation for the
cuto¤ type ^ given that he knows that all above him cooperate, and the
right hand side measures the material cost of cooperation, which given
the cuto¤ ^; is the same for all types. Note that the right hand side is
an increasing linear function in ^ and the left hand side is an increasing
function in ^ as well. To see that an equilibrium value of ^ must exist
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note that when ^ = 0; the lhs is smaller than the rhs, whereas when
^ = 1; the lhs is larger than the rhs.
Suppose now that the game has two periods of play. Again, the game
must consist of two cuto¤s, 1 and 2, such that all individuals above
(below) t cooperate (defect) in period t = 1; 2: But all individuals who
defected in the rst period would have lost their beliefs and must defect
again and hence it has to be that 2  1: In the Appendix we show that
it cannot be that 2 > 1 and hence 2 = 1  ~. Note that cooperation
in the second period is more attractive the higher are onesbeliefs about
belonging to the elect. Therefore, all individuals who cooperated in the
past will want to cooperate again.
In the rst period, individuals take into consideration that they will
also cooperate in the second period or in other words, individuals take
into consideration that cooperation implies that they have the option
value to self signal also in the second period. The rst period cuto¤ is
therefore a combination, weighted by ; of the myopic rst and second
period cuto¤s.
The unique cuto¤ ~ solves:
~
~+ (1  ~)2 "+ 
~
~+ (1  ~)3 " = (1 + )((1  ~)c + ~d) (1)
where arguments as above imply that the solution ~ 2 (0; 1) exists. We
can further show that:
Proposition 1: There exists a unique cuto¤ ~ 2 (0; 1) such that in
equilibrium, in both periods, all individuals with beliefs above ~ cooperate
and all with beliefs below ~ defect, The cuto¤ ~ decreases in  and in
"; and increases in d and c:
There is more cooperation when the option value is larger (captured
by ) and when the value from signalling is higher (captured by "):When
d orc are higher, the loss from cooperation when the opponent defects
is larger, implying that the material cost from self signalling is higher,
inducing individuals to cooperate less.
Note that the above analysis can be extended to more periods. The
result above extends to any number of periods T; with a unique solution
~T > 0 satisfying,
"
TX
t=1
t 1
~T
~T + (1  ~T )t+1 =
TX
t=1
t 1((1  ~T )c + ~Td):
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4 Discipline and cooperation
We have analysed a two-period model which has allowed us to focus on
the option value of self signalling. But having more than one period also
implies that agents may use their rivalsrst period behaviour to glean
information about their rivalsconvictions. In particular, cooperation in
the rst period may signal strong beliefs and hence can be informative
about second period behaviour.
In fact, one of Calvins main innovations was the creation of an insti-
tution which monitored and made public individualsbehaviour in the
social arena. A great deal of the Consistorys function was devoted to
resolving disputes within families, neighbours, and among business as-
sociates. To be able to do so, the Consistory members met once a week
and visited the homes of each Genevan family twice a year, which al-
lowed them to be well informed. Deviant behaviour -religious and civil
alike- was publicly punished. We now incorporate such an institution
into our model. In particular, we assume that rst period behaviour can
be observed, so that players condition their second period behaviour on
this information.16
Suppose that rst-period behaviour is observed. In addition to the
equilibrium notion specied above, it is now the case that individuals in
the second period correctly anticipate the probability that an individual
who cooperated in the rst period will cooperate again and optimise
accordingly.
To illustrate how social signalling and discipline may arise, consider
a particular equilibrium in which information creates a strong discipline
e¤ect, so that all types cooperate in the rst period. This implies that
in the rst period 1 = 1:17 This behaviour is sustained by a fear that
if one defects, some individuals will defect against him in the second
period instead of cooperating, as we illustrate below. In the second
period, cooperation carries no meaningful information, and behaviour
will be as in a one-period game. In other words, in the second period,
individuals above some ^2 cooperate and others defect, where ^2 solves
^2
^2 + (1  ^2)2 " = (1  ^2)c + ^2d (2)
However, after an out-of-equilibrium behaviour in which an individual
16Such institution can induce social behaviour for fear of punishment. We instead
take the view that its most important role was publicizing behaviour. See Kingdom
(1992).
17There may be other equlibria with more meaningful social signalling behaviour
in which only part of the population cooperates in the rst period. The key intuition
and results remain the same as the analysis below.
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defects, all others believe, and rightly so, that he will defect again. Given
that he defects, all types below 2 will defect against him, where 2
solves,
2
2 + (1  2)(1  ^2)" = d: (3)
It is easy to see from the equations above that 2 > ^2; and hence there
exists an interval of types that will change their behaviour in response
to a deviation. This creates the endogenous social discipline mechanism.
In the rst period, by monotonicity, we need to check the incentives
of the lowest type to cooperate. This type, with  = 0; knows that the
whole population cooperates in the rst period, and that he will defect
in the second period. To prefer to cooperate in the rst period, we need:
 c + (2   ^2)(b  a) > 0 (4)
Note that c is the loss in the rst period from cooperation, conditional
on all types cooperating. Cooperation vs. defection entails however a
second-period gain from an interval of types who cooperate instead of
defect. This type defects in the second period, and hence this provides
a gain of b   a; weighed by the probability of meeting these types and
by : We then have:
Proposition 2: Suppose that the incentive to defect given a rivals
defection, c; is su¢ ciently small. Then there exists a full discipline
equilibrium in which in the rst period all cooperate and in the second
period all above (below) some cuto¤ ^2 2 (0; 1) cooperate (defect).
5 Welfare
Note that given that cooperation is always benecial, self signalling dom-
inates a world in which all defect. But is social discipline, as character-
ized above, benecial compared with self signalling?
Consider a comparison between the self signalling equilibrium and
the social discipline equilibrium above. With only self signalling, coop-
eration is determined according to ~ as in equation (1). In the social
discipline case, society fully cooperates in the rst period, and second
period cooperation is by all types above ^2; determined by (2). For all
 > 0; ~ < ^2; the motivation to self signal across two periods yield
a higher cooperation level than in a one-period game (i.e., the second
period in the social discipline case). This implies a possible trade-o¤;
rst period cooperation is higher in the social discipline equilibrium but
second period cooperation levels are lower. We still nd though that the
average level of cooperation across the two periods can be higher under
the discipline e¤ect:
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Proposition 3: When " is su¢ ciently large, social welfare is higher
in the social discipline equilibrium compared with the equilibrium with
only self signalling.
Note that the social discipline e¤ect can only arise together with the
self signalling mechanism; the point of Proposition 3 is that the combi-
nation of both the theology and the monitoring institution can increase
social welfare, compared with an environment in which only the theol-
ogy exists (self signalling), or only the institution (where no cooperation
is possible). Intuitively, when " is su¢ ciently large, the cuto¤s in the
second period in the two di¤erent equilibria become su¢ ciently close, as
both induce relatively high levels of cooperation. This allows the disci-
pline equilibrium to dominate as it induces full cooperation in the rst
period.
6 Discussion
The role of religious organizations as providing information about eth-
ical behaviour has been noted before. Adam Smith observed that reli-
gions tend to produce and distribute moral information about individual
members, which allows traders to assess the risk involved in conduct-
ing business with these individuals.18 Weber (1906) writes of the social
pressure in American Protestant communities, Unqualied integrity, ev-
idenced by, for example, a system of xed prices in retail trade...appears
as the specic, indeed, really the only, form by which one can demonstrate
his qualication as a Christian and therewith his moral legitimation for
membership in the sect...admittance into the Baptist congregation was
primarily of decisive importance...because of the on-going inquiries about
moral and business conduct.
What is the mechanism that allows religious organization to signal
ethical or moral qualities? In this paper we suggest one such mecha-
nism. First, religious beliefs, for example those of predestination and
justication, induce individuals to behave cooperatively in order to self
signal. Without such a mechanism, there will be no cooperation even if
behaviour is observed. Second, the institution of the consistory allows
for social signalling, implying enhanced cooperation.
Naturally, other religious organizations have the theology and the
institutions to allow for pro-social behaviour. Beliefs in rewards and
punishments, whether in this life or the afterlife, are rife in many an-
cient and modern religions, and create a direct incentive to properly
behave in a social context. The Roman Catholic Church assured salva-
tion to individuals who had behaved properly and, in addition, accepted
18See Anderson (1988).
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the Churchs sacraments and submitted to the clerical authority. Par-
ticipation in such public and costly rituals might also indicate a strong
religious conviction; previous literature had focused on how costly reli-
gious rituals allow to signal religious beliefs or good behaviour to others
(see Iannaccone 1992, Berman 2000, Chwe 2003 and Levy and Razin
2011a). In Levy and Razin (2011b) we compare between religious insti-
tutions according to the signalling mechanism they employ. How these
relate to beliefs and religious governance seems a fruitful avenue for fu-
ture research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that a unique cuto¤must arise. To
proceed, suppose that 2 > 1: This implies that at the cuto¤ 2; the
relative payo¤ of cooperation and defection is equal so the type at the
cuto¤ is indi¤erent, and similarly the type at 1 disregards his second
period behaviour which does not depend on his rst period behaviour,
and hence considers only the one period utility. Thus the following two
equations have to be satised:
1
1 + (1  1)2 "=(1  1)c + 1d
2
2 + (1  2)2(1  1)"=(1  2)c + 2d
Note that the right hand side is linear for both expressions whereas
the left hand side is rst convex and then concave. Moreover in both
equations the RHS is strictly larger than the LHS when 1 and 2;
respectively, are zero, and the LHS strictly larger than the RHS when
1 and 2 are one, respectively. This implies that there is a unique cuto¤
1 for the rst equation and and 

2 for the second. But note that the
function on the left hand side of the second equation is higher than the
function in the rst, which implies that 2 < 1; a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that it is enough to show that
(2 ^2)(b a) is bounded asc 7! 0: Suppose that this is not the case,
i.e., that limc 7!0 (2   ^2)(b  a) = 0: This implies that limc 7!0 ^2 =
limc 7!0 2   where 2 and ^2 are given by,
2
2 + (1  2)(1  ^2)"=d
^2
^2 + (1  ^2)2 "=(1  ^2)c + ^2d
As these two equations hold all along we take their limit to get
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
 + (1  )2 "=d

 + (1  )2 "=
d
But as from the rst equation  < 1 (as " > d) we get a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that when  = 1 this induces the
highest chance for the self signalling equilibrium to improve social wel-
fare as this puts more weight on the second period where there is an
advantage for self signalling, as well as decreases the cuto¤ determined
in (1). We will show that the discipline equilibrium dominates for  = 1
and thus it will dominate for all :
For  = 1; social welfare is higher with social discipline if ^2
2

~ (which implies a higher average level of cooperation across the two
periods). Consider (2) where both sides are multiplied two:
2^2
^2 + (1  ^2)2 " = 2((1  ^2)c + ^2d) (5)
Plugging for 0:5^2 in (1) and comparing to (5), we have that the rhs
of (1) is lower than that in (5) by A = ^2(d  c) whereas the lhs is
lower by B = 2^2
^2+(1 ^2)2 "   0:5^20:5x+(1 0:5x)2 "   0:5^20:5x+(1 0:5x)3 ": Note that if
B > A we will have that ^2
2
 ~:
Note that
B
A
=
"
(d  c)(
2
^2 + (1  ^2)2  
0:5
0:5^2 + (1  0:5^2)2  
0:5
0:5^2 + (1  0:5^2)3 )
>
"
d
(2  0:5
0:75
  0:5
0:625
)
=
"
d
0:53333
and so we have that if " > d
0:53333
; B
A
> 1 
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